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Abstract
Java virtual machine (JVM) crashes are often due to an invalid memory reference to the JVM heap. Before the bug that caused
the invalid reference can be fixed, its location must be identified. It can be in either the JVM implementation or the native library
written in C invoked from Java applications. To help system engineers identify the location, we implemented a feature using page
protection that prevents threads executing native methods from referring to the JVM heap. This feature protects the JVM heap
during native method execution; if the heap is referred to invalidly, it interrupts the execution by generating a page-fault exception.
It then reports the location where the exception was generated. The runtime overhead for using this feature depends on the frequency
of native method calls because the protection is switched on each time a native method is called. We evaluated the runtime overhead
by running the SPECjvm98, SPECjbb2000, VolanoMark, and JFCMark benchmark suites on a PC with two Intel Xeon R© 1.6 GHz
processors. The performance loss was less than 2% for the benchmark items that do not call native methods so frequently
(∼104 times per second) and 5%–20% for the benchmark items that do (104–105 times per second). The worst performance
loss was 54%, which was recorded for a benchmark item that calls native methods 2.0× 106 times per second.
c© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Developers of JavaTM 1 runtime environments (JREs) are often asked to perform debugging when a JRE crashes
due to a corrupted heap. Because Java does not permit invalid memory references, it is not unreasonable for a JRE
user to suspect JRE bugs when he or she finds that the heap is corrupted. While the bug may be in the native libraries
used by the Java applications, the JRE user may be reluctant to ask a native library developer to perform the debugging
because it is often not easy to identify which native library contains the bug. This is because the JRE may crash long
after the bug corrupted the heap, so all that the JRE user can tell from the core file of the crashed JRE process is that
the heap is corrupted and had been allocated by the JRE.
To cope with this problem, we implemented a JRE that uses page protection to protect its heap from invalid
references due to bugs in the native libraries. The JRE protects its heap during native method execution. Basically,
native methods should refer to the JRE heap via the Java Native Interface [1] (JNI). Any direct reference is invalid if
the JNI implementation does not permit native methods to refer directly to the body of a Java array, as that of HotSpot
E-mail address: yuji.chiba.pd@hitachi.com.
1 Java and HotSpot are trademarks of Sun Microsystems, Inc. in the United States and other countries.
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VM (jdk1.5.0 06) does not. When the native method execution refers to the heap invalidly, the JRE interrupts the
execution by generating a page-fault exception and then reports the location where the exception was generated. This
helps the JRE user determine whether the memory corruption was caused by code in a native library and, if so, which
library.
This heap protection feature permits a thread to write to the heap only when the thread is executing a Java method.
When the thread calls a native method through JNI, it is not granted permission by our JNI implementation to write
to the heap. This protection feature controls permission to write to the heap by thread, while mainstream operating
systems such as WindowsR© 2 and LinuxR© 3 control permission by process. In other words, they provide a protection
domain for each process, not for each thread. A protection domain is an attribute given to a subject that defines the
permissions granted to the subject [2]. Operating systems control access to each OS resource by using a protection
domain. These OS-supported protection domains are thus not appropriate for implementing our heap protection
feature. Given this situation, we modified Linux and implemented a per-thread protection domain for the heap, which
we shall call ‘a heap protection domain’. It is used as follows.
(1) If a program component (a set of procedures) uses heap that is to be referenced only from the component, the
component asks the OS to create a heap protection domain for it. This is usually done during program component
initialization.
(2) The program component then allocates the heap, and asks the OS to give its heap protection domain permission
to reference the heap.
• A heap protection domain belongs to a process and every thread in a process belongs to one of the process’
heap protection domains. The OS permits a thread to reference memory based on the heap protection domain
to which it belongs.
(3) At every entry to the program component, the developer of the component adds code asking the OS to modify
the heap protection domain so that a thread that executes the code acquires permission to refer to the heap for the
component. The code asks the OS to let the thread belong to the protection domain for the component. The entries
to the component reside in the prologs to the public procedures of the program component and after the external
procedure calls.
(4) At every exit from the program component, the developer of the component adds code asking the OS to modify
the heap protection domain, so that the thread that executed the code gives up the permission to refer to the heap
for the component. The exits from the component reside in the epilogs of the public procedures of the component
and before the external procedure calls.
Since our JVM product supports a wide range of platforms (processors and operating systems), we need to protect
the JVM heap on as many platforms as possible. Since we implemented our approach on a Linux/IA32 platform in
April 2006, we have encountered one case of a JVM crash that we could have easily debugged using our protection
feature, but we could not, because the crash happened on the Linux/IA64 platform. To debug such crashes, we need to
use operating systems that support the heap protection domain, and this limits the practicality of our feature. However,
since our heap protection domain implementation requires only a conventional page protection feature provided by
most processors, it can be implemented on most operating systems.
We implemented our heap protection feature on a JVM and estimated the runtime overhead. The result of this
evaluation, i.e. whether the feature is practical, is the main contribution of this paper. To ensure reliable evaluation
results, we implemented the heap protection feature on a practical JVM and OS (HotSpotTMvirtual machine [3]
(HotSpot VM) and Linux), and evaluated the runtime overhead using four benchmark suites (SPECjvm98 [4],
SPECjbb2000 [5], VolanoMarkTM 4 [6], and JFCMarkTM 5 [7]) consisting of practical Java applications. To the best of
our knowledge, such evaluation data has not been previously presented.
Unfortunately, our heap protection feature cannot universally detect bugs in native methods. It cannot detect a bug
that does not access memory invalidly. For example, it cannot detect misuse of a signal handler. Because typical JVM
implementations use a signal handler to detect null pointer exceptions, the use of the signal handler in native methods
2 Windows is a registered trademark of Microsoft Corporation in the United States and other countries.
3 Linux is a trademark or a registered trademark of Linus Torvalds in the United States and other countries.
4 VolanoMark is a trademark of Volano Software.
5 JFCMark is a trademark of Excelsior, LLC.
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can be a bug. Our heap protection feature cannot detect the bug because the bug does not access memory invalidly.
Even if a bug in a native method accesses memory invalidly, our feature cannot detect it if the memory accessed
is not the protected heap. It does not protect memory areas such as global variables and thread stacks. Moreover,
native methods can invalidly overwrite the protected heap by passing broken data to JNI functions or by maliciously
canceling the protection. Despite these limitations, we believe our heap protection feature can aid in the debugging of
native methods.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe our implementation of the heap protection domain, and
in Section 3 we describe our implementation of the heap protection feature. In Section 4 we discuss the implementation
of setpd(), which is a system call to modify the protection domain to which a thread belongs (and which generates
most of the runtime overhead related to using the heap protection feature), and in Section 5 we evaluate the runtime
overhead. In Section 6 we explore related work. In Section 7 we summarize the key points.
2. Implementation of heap protection domain
We implemented the heap protection domain on Linux for IA32 processors using a page global directory (PGD),
which is one of the address translation tables IA32 processors used to implement paging and page protection. This
section first describes implementation of virtual memory on IA32 processors and then describes the implementation
of the heap protection domain using PGD.
2.1. Implementation of virtual memory on IA32 processors
IA32 processors implement virtual memory using both segmentation and paging [8]. They first translate each
logical address into a linear address using segmentation and then translate the linear address into a physical address
using paging.
IA32 processors provide two paging implementations. One uses two-level address-translation tables, and the other
uses three-level address-translation tables. We describe only the former because we used it to implement the heap
protection domain. The former translates the linear address into a physical address as follows.
(1) To translate linear address L , the processor first looks at its CR3 register because it holds the PGD address. The
processor then refers to the entry in the PGD for L . An entry in the PGD is called a directory entry. The processor
gets the address of the directory entry for L by adding the highest ten bits of L as an offset to the PGD address.
(2) The processor looks at the bit in the directory entry that indicates to what the directory entry points.
(a) If the value of the bit is 0, the directory entry points to a page table, which is an address translation table whose
entry points to a 4 KByte page. In this case, the processor translates L into the physical address as illustrated
in Fig. 1(a). The processor assembles the physical address from the page table entry and the lowest 12 bits of
L . The processor also looks at bits in the page table entry for access control to the page.
(b) If the value of the bit is 1, the directory entry points to a 4 MByte page (a large page). In this case, the processor
translates L into the physical address, as illustrated in Fig. 1(b). The processor assembles the physical address
from the directory entry and the lowest 22 bits of L .
2.2. Implementation of heap protection domain using PGD
The directory entry for a large page contains bits that indicate reading or writing permission, and the processor
permits reference to the page on the basis of these bits. We implemented the heap protection domain using these bits
as follows.
(1) In the system call to create a heap protection domain, createpd(), the OS creates a PGD. For simplicity, our
implementation allocates only one PGD and shares page tables among heap protection domains. Therefore, our
heap protection domain can set permission for large pages only.6 To enable permissions to be set for 4 KByte
pages, page tables must be created for each protection domain.
6 Linux maps large pages only to address space that programs committed specifically for large pages.
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Fig. 1. Linear address translation on IA32 processors.
(2) In the system call to set permissions for large pages, mprotect(), the OS sets the bits in the directory entries that
indicate reading or writing permission.
(3) In the system call to set the protection domain for the current thread, setpd(), the OS looks up the pointer to the
PGD for the target heap protection domain and loads the pointer into the CR3 register.
(4) During task switching, the OS looks up the pointer to the PGD for the protection domain to which the next task
belongs, and loads the pointer into the CR3 register.
(5) In the system call to delete a heap protection domain, deletepd(), the OS deletes the PGD. As we describe in
Section 4, the implementation of deletepd() is slightly more complex because it must prevent deleting the PGD
if it is in use.
3. Heap protection in HotSpot VM
In our implementation of heap protection for HotSpot VM, we protect two heaps that HotSpot VM uses.
Heap for Java: HotSpot VM uses this heap to allocate the data structures Java applications allocate, such as Java
instances.
Heap for dynamically compiled code: HotSpot VM’s dynamic compiler uses this heap for storing dynamically
compiled code.
We protect both heaps from modification by threads executing native methods and protect the heap for dynamically
compiled code from modification by threads executing Java methods (including the runtime routines HotSpot VM
provides). Basically, we permit only the threads for dynamic compilation to write to the heap for dynamically compiled
code. This HotSpot VM is thus secured because the dynamically compiled code is protected against threads executing
Java methods that have received malicious input. This means that control of the HotSpot VM cannot be taken by
overwriting the dynamically compiled code with malicious code.
Besides these heaps, the HotSpot VM internally allocates heap using malloc(), and use it for various purposes.
For example, the dynamic compiler stores the intermediate representation in this area. Our heap protection feature
does not as yet protect this area, but this would not be difficult to do.
Our heap protection feature works as follows. At start-up, the HotSpot VM creates two heap protection domains.
It uses one, PDjava, to execute Java methods, and the other, PDcompiler, for dynamic compilation. The HotSpot VM
sets permissions for its heap as illustrated in Fig. 2 by using mprotect(). It permits both heap protection domains to
write to the heap for Java, and PDcompiler to write to the heap for dynamically compiled code.
The HotSpot VM does not allow PDdefault to write to both heaps. PDdefault is a heap protection domain created by
default, and the HotSpot VM uses it to execute C functions. The HotSpot VM permits PDdefault to read from the heap
for Java, so that JNI calls from C functions that cannot modify the heap can be executed without invoking setpd().
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Fig. 2. PGDs used by HotSpot VM.
After creating PDjava and PDcompiler, the HotSpot VM runs three kinds of threads: VM threads, compiler threads,
and Java threads. The HotSpot VM runs them as follows.
VM threads handle tasks such as those for garbage collection and deoptimization. Because they update references
to the Java instances embedded in the dynamically compiled code when they operate garbage collection, the
HotSpot VM runs them in PDcompiler.
Compiler threads operate dynamic compilations. The HotSpot VM runs them in PDcompiler.
Java threads execute Java methods using the interpreter or the dynamically compiled code. They also execute native
methods and runtime routines. They execute Java methods and runtime routines in PDjava and execute native
methods in PDdefault. To set their protection domains correctly, we embedded setpd() calls in the JNI
implementation.
When a Java thread executing a Java method calls a native method through JNI, it calls setpd() to set
its heap protection domain PDdefault, and it calls setpd() again at the end of the native method execution
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1: struct pd struct{ // Protection domain
2: pgd t* pgd; // Reference to PGD
3: atomic t users; // Number of threads belonging to
4: };
5: struct pd cluster struct{ // Cluster of pd struct (a binary tree node)
6: struct pd struct pd[PD PER CLUSTER];
7: struct pd cluster struct* left;
8: struct pd cluster struct* right;
9: }
10: struct mm struct{ // Memory manager for a process
11: · · ·
12: struct pd cluster struct* pd tree;// Root of protection domain cluster tree
13: rw lock t pd lock;// Lock to be acquired on reference to protection domain cluster tree
14: };
15: struct task struct{ // Data structure for a thread
16: struct mm struct* mm;
17: · · ·
18: int pdid; // Protection domain to which this thread belongs
19: };
20: extern struct task struct* current; // Current thread
21:
22: long setpd(unsigned int new pdid){
23: long result = current->pdid;
24: if (new pdid != current->pdid){
25: struct pd struct *new pd;
26: pgd t *new pgd;
27: read lock(&(current->mm->pd lock));
28: if (new pd = find pd(new pdid)){
29: new pgd = new pd->pgd;
30: if (new pdid)
31: atomic inc(&(new pd->users));
32: if (current->pdid)
33: atomic dec(&(find pd(current->pdid)->users));
34: load cr3(new pgd);
35: current->pdid = new pdid;
36: }
37: else
38: result = -EINVAL;




Fig. 3. Canonical implementation of setpd().
to set its heap protection domain PDjava. When a Java thread executing a native method calls a Java method
through JNI, it does the opposite.
Because Java threads execute runtime routines in PDjava, allocation to the heap for Java in runtime routines
such as class resolution do not cause page faults. Java threads temporarily set its protection domain PDcompiler
when they execute runtime routines such as inline cache miss handler in order to patch dynamically compiled
code. However, Java threads do not have to set its protection domain PDcompiler in garbage collection because
they do not operate garbage collection themselves but ask VM threads to do it.
If an invalid memory access is detected while running these threads, the HotSpot VM aborts immediately and
dumps its core file.
4. Implementation of setpd()
Because setpd() is called twice for every JNI invocation that may modify the heap for Java, its efficiency is
important. Fig. 3 shows a canonical implementation of setpd().
In Fig. 3, setpd() acquires a lock to traverse the protection domain at line 27, looks up pd struct for its argument
new pdid at line 28, maintains the number of threads belonging to the new and old protection domains at lines 30–33,
loads a pointer to the PGD for the new protection domain into the CR3 register at line 34, and releases the lock at
line 39.
To improve setpd() performance, we can refrain from supporting deletepd() and free heap protection domains
only when the process terminates. This enables the following code supporting deletepd() to be omitted.
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Code on lines 27 and 39: This code acquires and releases the lock for traversing the binary tree of
pd cluster struct pointed to by member field pd tree of mm struct, but the lock is not needed if
deletepd() is not supported.
createpd() also modifies the binary tree as deletepd() does, but it can be executed in parallel
with setpd() without the lock if it is carefully implemented: createpd() should initialize the PGD and
pd cluster struct before connecting them to the binary tree. Otherwise, another processor executing
setpd() in parallel with createpd() may refer to an uninitialized PGD or pd cluster struct, resulting
in an invalid memory reference.
We use a binary tree data structure for recording heap protection domains so as not to limit the maximum
number of heap protection domains per process, despite the possibility of concurrency problems. Using a
fixed-size table solves many concurrency problems, but it limits the maximum number of domains.
Code on lines 30–33: This code maintains the number of threads belonging to each protection domain so that
deletepd() cannot delete a protection domain to which any thread belongs. There is no reason to maintain
the number if deletepd() is not supported.
4.1. Implementation of deletepd() using read–copy update
While omitting these lines of code improves performance, not supporting deletepd() is problematic in some
cases. For example, a user application that repeatedly creates and destroys a JVM soon consumes all heap protection
domains if it uses our JVM and the OS does not support deletepd(). In such cases, we can implement deletepd()
using read–copy update (RCU) [9], which is a synchronization mechanism that permits read-side access without
synchronization, at the cost of expensive write-side access. Therefore, RCU is often used for read-mostly data
structures. Because the heap protection domain (pd struct in Fig. 3) is a read-mostly data structure, one read by
setpd() frequently and written by createpd() and deletepd() infrequently, using RCU provides better setpd()
performance than the canonical setpd() implementation shown in Fig. 3.
Figs. 4 and 5 show implementations of setpd() and deletepd() using RCU. Before exploring the code, we
investigate the concept of RCU and Linux support for RCU.
4.1.1. Read–copy update
RCU is a synchronization mechanism used in parallel computing environments. In such an environment, read and
write access to data structures must be carefully handled, and read access to partially updated data structures should
generally be prevented.
An example of such a case is shown in Fig. 6(a), in which a writer thread is updating the contents of cell #2 in an
“apple status list” from ‘green sour’ to ‘red sweet’. The writer first updates the color field and then updates the taste
field. If a reader thread reads from cell #2 when the writer has updated the color field but not the taste field, it retrieves
incorrect information (the apple is red but sour).
To prevent reader threads from reading from a partially updated data structure, we can use reader–writer locks to
block reader threads while the writer thread is updating data structures, as illustrated in Fig. 3, but locking is costly.
RCU reduces this cost by permitting read access without locking. RCU prevents read access to partially updated
data structures by updating them as follows.
(1) A writer thread acquires a lock so that only one writer thread can update the data structures.
(2) The writer thread reads the target data structure, creates a copy of it, and applies the updates to the copy (Fig. 6(b)).
(3) The writer thread updates the pointers to the original data structure so that they point to the copied one (Fig. 6(c)).
(4) The writer thread waits until the other CPUs finish reading from the original data structure, and then frees it and
releases the lock.
This algorithm is called ‘read–copy update’ because it first read a data structure to create a copy and then applies
updates to the copy, while allowing read access to the original data structure. If we use RCU to update the apple status
list in Fig. 6(a), reader threads can read from the old cell #2 or the new cell #2 but cannot read partially updated
information (‘red sour’) from cell #2.
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1: #define PDID OFFSET MASK (PD PER CLUSTER-1)
2: #define PDID OFFSET(pdid) (pdid & PDID OFFSET MASK)
3: #define PDID LOCATION(pdid) ((pdid >> LOG2 PD PER CLUSTER)+1)
4:
5: static pgd t* find pgd(unsigned int pdid){
6: unsigned int location = PDID LOCATION(pdid);
7: unsigned int offset = PDID OFFSET(pdid);
8: struct pd cluster struct* pd cluster = rcu dereference(current->mm->pd cluster tree);
9: pgd t* result;
10: while(location != 1){
11: pd cluster =
12: rcu dereference((location & 1) ? pd cluster->right node : pd cluster->left node);
13: location = location >> 1;
14: if (pd cluster == NULL)
15: return (NULL);
16: }




21: long setpd(unsigned int new pdid){
22: long result = current->pdid;
23: if (new pdid != current->pdid){
24: pgd t *new pgd;
25: rcu read lock();
26: if (new pgd = find pgd(new pdid)) {
27: load cr3(new pgd);
28: current->pdid = new pdid;
29: rcu read unlock();
30: }
31: else{
32: rcu read unlock();
33: down(&(current->mm->pd sem));
34: if (new pgd = find pgd(new pdid)) {
35: load cr3(new pgd);
36: current->pdid = new pdid;
37: }
38: else






Fig. 4. Implementation of setpd() using RCU.
4.1.2. Linux RCU support
Linux has supported RCU since the development of kernel version 2.5 and provides the following RCU application
programming interfaces (APIs) to kernel developers.
synchronize rcu() is called by a writer thread to block the writer’s execution until all other CPUs exit the read-
side critical section.
rcu read lock() prevents thread preemption. Because the kernel knows that a reader thread has exited the read-side
critical section when the thread is preempted, the reader thread calls this API before entering the read-side
critical section to notify the kernel that it is doing so.
rcu read unlock() enables thread preemption.
rcu dereference() does any read-side memory barrier operations before reading from data structures updated
by RCU if the CPU requires such operations. Currently, only Alpha [10] needs memory barrier operations
within rcu dereference(). On other CPUs, it is compiled to nothing.
rcu assign pointer() does a write-side memory barrier operation and then updates the pointer to the original
data structure so that it points to the updated one.
4.1.3. Implementation using RCU
In Figs. 4 and 5, setpd() and deletepd() are implemented using these APIs. The reader, setpd(), calls
rcu read lock() at the entrance of the read-side critical section at line 25 in Fig. 4 and tries to look up the pointer to
the PGD at line 26. In looking up the pointer, the reader calls rcu dereference() before dereferencing the pointer
Y. Chiba / Science of Computer Programming 70 (2008) 149–167 157
1: bool is empty pd cluster(struct pd cluster struct* pd cluster){
2: if ((pd cluster->left node == NULL) && (pd cluster->right node == NULL)){
3: int i;
4: for(i=0; i<PD PER CLUSTER; i++)






11: void unlink empty pd clusters(unsigned int location, struct pd cluster struct** link){
12: struct pd cluster struct* pd cluster = *link;
13: if (location != 1)
14: unlink empty pd clusters(location >> 1,
15: (location & 1) ? &(pd cluster->right): &(pd cluster->left));
16: if (is empty pd cluster(pd cluster)){
17: rcu assign pointer(*link, NULL);
18: synchronize rcu();
19: free pd cluster(pd cluster);
20: }
21: }
22: long deletepd(unsigned int pdid){
23: long result = -EINVAL;
24: if (pdid != current->pdid){
25: struct pd struct* pd;
26: down(&(current->mm->pd sem));
27: if (pd = find pd(pdid)){
28: pgd t* pgd = pd->pgd;
29: rcu assign pointer(pd->pgd, NULL); //Notify pd is to be deleted.
30: synchronize rcu(); //Wait until all CPUs are notified.
31: write lock irq(&tasklist lock);
32: foreach thread t in the process
33: if (t->pdid == pdid){
34: rcu assign pointer(pd->pgd, pgd); // pd is in use: cannot delete
35: goto EXIT:
36: }
37: unlink empty pd clusters(PD LOCATION(pdid), &(current->mm->pd cluster tree));
38: result = 0; // Deletion completed.
39: EXIT:






Fig. 5. Implementation of deletepd() using RCU.
updated by writers (createpd() and deletepd()). If the pointer is found, the reader places it in the CR3 register at
line 27 and calls rcu read unlock() at line 29 to exit from the read-side critical section. Otherwise, the reader exits
from the read-side critical section at line 32 and acquires the semaphore to access the protection domain search tree
at line 33. At line 34, the reader tries to look up the pointer to the PGD again. If it is found, the reader places it in the
CR3 register at line 35. Otherwise, it sets the return value to -EINVAL (an error code for an invalid argument) at line
39. At line 40, the reader releases the semaphore, and returns at line 43.
The writer (deletepd()) acquires the semaphore at line 26 in Fig. 5, and calls rcu assign pointer() to update
the pointer to the PGD to NULL. This notifies the readers that the writer is trying to delete the heap protection domain.
When the reader (setpd()) finds that the pointer is NULL at line 26 in Fig. 4, it acquires the semaphore at line 33,
and confirms at line 34 whether the heap protection domain has actually been deleted. After the notification to the
readers, the writer calls synchronize rcu() at line 30 in Fig. 5. It waits until all the other CPUs are notified and
then checks whether there is a thread belonging to the heap protection domain (lines 31–36). If one is found, the writer
gives up deleting the heap protection domain and, at line 34, restores the pointer to the PGD. Otherwise, the deletion
has successfully completed. The writer releases the semaphore at line 42 and returns at line 44.
5. Evaluation
To evaluate the runtime overhead for protecting HotSpot VM heaps, we implemented a heap protection domain on
Linux (kernel 2.6.14) and the heap protection for HotSpot VM (jdk1.5.0 06) and then ran benchmarks both on the
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Fig. 6. Read–copy update.
Table 1
Benchmark items in SPECjvm98
Item Description
201 compress Compression/decompression of text files
202 jess Expert system
209 db Database
213 javac Compiler for Java source code
222 mpegaudio Decompression of MP3
227 mtrt Ray tracing using multiple threads
228 jack Parser generator
original platform (Linux and HotSpot VM) and on a platform with heap protection. The benchmarks were run on a
PC (CPU: Intel XeonR© 7 1.6 GHz × 2, memory: 2 GByte).
The benchmark suites were SPECjvm98, SPECjbb2000, VolanoMark version 2.5.0.9 (loopback mode), and
JFCMark version 1.0. SPECjvm98 is a suite of client-side Java applications, as summarized in Table 1. SPECjbb2000
and VolanoMark are used to evaluate the performance of server-side business logic and chat server software,
respectively. JFCMark is a suite of GUI performance tests, as summarized in Table 2.
7 Intel Xeon and Itanium are registered trademarks of Intel Corporation and its subsidiaries in the United States and other countries.
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Table 2




IntFrame100 Opening/closing internal frames
IntFrameDrag Dragging an internal frame
IntFrameLAF Look-and-feel modification
IntFrameSelect Selecting internal frames
BoxLayout BoxLayout manager test
FlowLayout FlowLayout manager test
GridLayout GridLayout manager test
OverlayLayout OverlayLayout manager test
SrcFineScroll Fine scrolling HTML text
SrcLoad Loading text files into JEditorPane
SrcRowScroll Row scrolling HTML text
TableFineScroll Fine scrolling a table
TableRowScroll Row scrolling a table
TableScale Scaling a table
TreeAddRem Adding/removing tree nodes
TreeExpCollDeep Expanding/collapsing a deep tree
TreeExpCollWide Expanding/collapsing a wide tree
The runtime options for HotSpot VM, listed below, were used with and without the heap protection.
-Xmx -Xms. These options specify the maximum and initial heap sizes. Both were set to 512 MByte for SPECjvm98
and 1024 MByte for SPECjbb2000. For VolanoMark and JFCMark, the maximum heap sizes were set to 64
and 40 MByte, respectively.
-server. This option specifies the use of the server compiler, one of HotSpot VM’s two dynamic compilers. While
it takes longer to compile, the compiled code is better optimized.
-XX:+UseLargePages. This option specifies that Java instances and dynamically compiled code are to be placed
on large pages. Original HotSpot VM (jdk1.5.0 06 for Linux) does not place dynamically compiled code on
large pages even when -XX:+UseLargePages is specified. We modified HotSpot VM to place dynamically
compiled code on large pages when the option is specified. The modified version was used with and without
the heap protection.
The other runtime options were set to the default values. Services not required for the benchmarking, such as the
networking, were turned off so as to avoid noise in the benchmark scores. We executed each benchmark item 20 times
and used the average (arithmetical mean) benchmark score to calculate the runtime overhead.
The results of the evaluation are shown in Fig. 7. The vertical axis represents the performance loss compared
to the performance without using the heap protection, and the horizontal axis shows the benchmarked items.
The canonical implementation of setpd() resulted in an average performance loss of 15.4% (geometrical mean)
and a maximum loss of 58.3%; removing support for deletepd() reduced the average loss to 13.5% and the
maximum loss to 52.4%. Using RCU resulted in an average loss of 13.1% and a maximum loss of 54.8%. The
performance of the implementation using RCU was nearly equal to that of the implementation that did not support
deletepd(). The average performance improvement over the canonical setpd() implementation was 2.3% when
we did not support deletepd() and 2.7% when we used RCU. The setpd() implementation using RCU (Fig. 4)
calls rcu read lock() or rcu read unlock() on the read-side critical section entry or exit in addition to the
operations executed in the setpd() implementation without support for deletepd(), but the performance loss due
to the additional operations was negligible. The setpd() also calls rcu dereference(), but this does not cause
performance loss as it is compiled to nothing on IA32 processors.
Table 3 shows the frequency of JNI calls when each benchmark item was executed without using heap protection.
Only JNI calls that invoke setpd() when executed using heap protection were counted; JNI calls from C functions
that cannot modify the heap for Java do not invoke setpd(), as described in Section 3. VolanoMark has two entries
in Table 3, because it runs two processes (a server process and a client process) in parallel. Most of the JFCMark
benchmark items suffered bigger performance losses than the SPEC ones because GUI operations result in JNI calls
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Fig. 7. Runtime overhead of using heap protection.
Table 3
Frequency of JNI calls that invoke setpd()
Benchmark Frequency Benchmark Frequency
item (times/s) item (times/s)
201 compress 473 IntFrameLAF 66 039
202 jess 7 491 IntFrameSelect 75 157
209 db 1 440 BoxLayout 45 094
213 javac 34 429 FlowLayout 56 277
222 mpegaudio 754 GridLayout 56 291
227 mtrt 3 930 OverlayLayout 64 047
228 jack 45 434 SrcFineScroll 35 385
VolanoMark (Server) 70 876 SrcLoad 33 217
(Client) 45 087 SrcRowScroll 26 445
ButtonLAF 57 514 TableFineScroll 34 967
ButtonSelect 5 791 TableRowScroll 32 739
DrawImage 40 253 TableScale 49 793
LoadImage 5 912 TreeAddRem 21 514
TransformImage 380 TreeExpCollDeep 37 797
IntFrame100 74 408 TreeExpCollWide 15 667
IntFrameDrag 202 444
that require setpd(). The IntFrameDrag item suffered the biggest performance loss because it makes JNI calls the
most frequently.
5.1. Analysis of runtime overhead
To investigate ways to reduce the runtime overhead, we analyzed the runtime overhead for four benchmarked items;
213 javac, 228 jack, IntFrame100, and IntFrameDrag. We selected these items because the first two imposed
the most runtime overhead in SPECjvm98, and the last two did so in JFCMark. We estimated the overhead originating
from two sources.
DEL. Runtime overhead to support deletepd(). This comes from code in the implementation of setpd() (lines 27,
30–33, and 39 in Fig. 3).
CR3. Runtime overhead to rewrite the CR3 register and to reload the translation look-aside buffer (TLB).
The TLB is the processor resource used to accelerate address translation. An IA32 processor flushes the TLB on
rewriting the CR3 register and reloads it on subsequent memory accesses. However, the processor must access more
memory to reload it and this causes runtime overhead.
Y. Chiba / Science of Computer Programming 70 (2008) 149–167 161
Table 4
Source of performance loss and execution cost of setpd()
Benchmark Performance loss (%) Execution
item ODEL OCR3 Other cost (µs)
213 javac 19.8 53.2 27.0 1.9
228 jack 22.8 60.8 16.4 2.8
IntFrame100 17.4 51.0 31.6 1.9
IntFrameDrag 22.2 56.8 21.0 3.3
When a process uses the heap protection domain, the OS rewrites the CR3 register when it does one of two actions.
(1) Execution of setpd(). The code that rewrites the CR3 register is at line 34 in Fig. 3.
(2) Context switch from a thread that belongs to a heap protection domain to a thread that belongs to another protection
domain.
The former accounted for most of the runtime overhead in the four benchmark items because these items frequently
call setpd(), as Table 3 shows, while context switch does not happen so often.
Using the canonical implementation of setpd() shown in Fig. 3, we estimated the runtime overhead from DEL and
CR3 as follows.
(1) For each of the benchmark items, we measured the execution time for four cases.
Toriginal. Neither the heap protection domain nor the heap protection feature was implemented.
Tprotect. The heap protection domain was implemented and used to protect the HotSpot VM heap.
TnoDEL. The heap protection domain was implemented and used to protect the HotSpot VM heap, but the code
supporting deletepd() was omitted.
TnoCR3. The heap protection domain was implemented and used to protect the HotSpot VM heap, but the code to
rewrite the CR3 register for the protection domain was omitted.
(2) The share of total runtime overhead for DEL and CR3 when using the heap protection was calculated using the
following expressions.
ODEL = Tprotect − TnoDELTprotect − Toriginal
OCR3 = Tprotect − TnoCR3Tprotect − Toriginal
Because the execution time was not consistent between runs, the estimation accuracy was not good; however, the
estimations should be roughly approximate. The results of the estimation as well as execution cost of calling setpd()
are shown in Table 4. We estimated the cost for each benchmark item by simply dividing the total overhead for using
the heap protection (Tprotect− Toriginal) by the execution count of setpd(). This estimation neglects runtime overhead
that is not due to setpd().
As shown in Table 4, ODEL and OCR3 differed among the four benchmark items, possibly due to inconsistencies
in runtime overhead to reload the TLB. Reloading the TLB is required because the processor flushes it on rewriting
the CR3 register, and the overhead is affected by the memory access pattern and flush timing. The average cost of
reloading the TLB drops when flushing is done continually and a small part of the TLB is reloaded between flushes.
The cost to call setpd()measured using a program that continually calls setpd() was 1.17 µs, which is smaller than
the cost shown in Table 4. This is because, in practical applications, more of the TLB is reloaded between flushes.
As shown in Table 4, over half the runtime overhead came from CR3, so we must reduce this overhead to improve
performance. However, it is not easy to reduce the overhead by improving the implementation of setpd(). As we
describe in Section 6, we can reduce the overhead using hardware support, if it is available.
The runtime overhead due to DEL can be eliminated by not supporting deletepd() or by using RCU, as described
in Section 4. There is little room for reducing runtime overhead from other than CR3 and DEL, as most of it is due to
code executed in common for every system call, such as interrupt instructions.
Runtime overhead can also be reduced by eliminating setpd() calls. It is possible to omit most setpd() calls in
SPECjvm98, SPECjbb2000, VolanoMark, and JFCMark if the HotSpot VM eliminates calls to setpd() in JNI calls
to the native methods provided by the JRE. This may not be important because HotSpot VM and the native method
162 Y. Chiba / Science of Computer Programming 70 (2008) 149–167
are together in one program product, the JRE, and engineers analyzing crashed Java applications generally ask the
JRE developer to debug the problem whether the bug is in the JVM or in the native methods provided by the JRE.
This eliminates most setpd() calls for pure Java applications, such as SPECjvm98, SPECjbb2000, VolanoMark, and
JFCMark, but this is of no help for Java applications that frequently call their own native methods.
6. Related work
Invalid memory references have plagued program developers since the dawn of computing, and many attempts have
been made to eliminate them, mainly by people working in four fields: programming languages, virtual machines,
hardware and operating systems.
In this section, we survey their contributions and compare them with the heap protection domain.
6.1. Programming languages
Programming in traditional languages such as C and assembly language enables a programmer to cast any value
to a pointer and then refer to memory through the pointer, but this often results in an invalid memory reference.
Thus modern programming languages such as Java [11] and C# [12] do not provide pointers. They provide references
instead. References differ from pointers in that a reference may not be a raw memory address. They also provide such
features as array index checking, which prevents invalid memory accesses through references. Programs written in
modern programming languages thus cannot cause invalid memory accesses.
While using a modern programming language is an effective way to avoid invalid memory accesses, it is not
effective for programs that cannot be easily written in a modern language or for programs that have already been
developed in a traditional language. SafeC [13] and CCured [14] prevent legacy C code from performing invalid
memory accesses by inserting range checks. If we can always use them to detect bugs in native libraries attached
to JVMs, our protection feature is useless, but their practicality is limited because of the runtime overhead for range
checks and incompatible pointer formats. CCured suffers less runtime overhead (30%–150%) than SafeC does (130%–
540%) because it statically verifies pointer operations and inserts a range check only when one is needed. Static
verification is also used in proof-carrying code [15,16] to ensure safe execution of binary code without a runtime-
check, but it is not easy to statically verify practical-size programs. Both SafeC and CCured use fat pointers to
implement a range check, so their pointer formats are not compatible with the conventional one (only an address).
Thus, legacy C code that suppose the conventional pointer format does not work correctly when compiled using either
SafeC or CCured. Jones and Kelly proposed a backward-compatible range check implementation, but it suffers an
even bigger performance loss [17]. Even if this pointer format compatibility were not a problem, we cannot ignore the
fact that recompilation involves costly quality assurance for the recompiled program.
6.2. Virtual machines
Some debugging environments provide virtual machines that monitor program execution [18–21]. The virtual
machines detect invalid memory accesses by monitoring the execution of the memory access instructions as they
interpret each machine instruction during the target program execution. While virtual machines are useful for
debugging, they may not be appropriate for monitoring programs in practical use because of their large runtime
overhead. Koju [21] reported that the performance of a virtual machine is 231.2 times slower than that of the machine
on which it is running if the virtual machine monitors all store instructions and is implemented as an interpreter. A
virtual machine implementation using dynamic translation improves performance so that it is 11.7 times slower than
that of the actual machine.
Because our final goal is to monitor an application server process in practical use, approaches that cause a big
performance loss are not appropriate. The heap protection domain suffers much less performance loss in monitoring
memory references than virtual machines (up to two times slower than that of the actual machine, as described in
Section 5).
Hastings [22] used an approach similar to dynamic translation in Purify. Purify is not a virtual machine but a
debugging tool. While a dynamic translator dynamically inserts check logic into the translated code, Purify statically
inserts check logic into the target program itself in order to detect invalid memory accesses. Hastings showed that
Purify’s runtime-overhead in running gcc is a factor of three.
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Fig. 8. Concept of Shinagawa’s implementation.
The advantage of Purify’s approach, inserting check logic into the object code, is that it does not need modification
of the operating system. The performance degradation is not big, like our approach. The disadvantage is its
implementation cost. In contrast, the advantage of our approach is its small implementation cost. The amount of
source code we added or modified was about 60 lines in the JVM and about 500 lines in the OS when we used RCU,
including the blanks but not the comments. Our implementation, however, supports Linux/IA32/two-level address
translation table platform only, and support for other platforms needs additional code. Neither Purify nor our heap
protection can completely detect invalid memory accesses. For example, our heap protection cannot detect invalid
access to global variables, while Purify can do so. However, if the native method dynamically generates code and then
executes the code, Purify cannot detect invalid memory accesses in the generated code, while our heap protection can
do so. The disadvantage of our approach is that we have to modify the operating system if it does not support a heap
protection domain, and this is impossible if the source code is not available.
6.3. Hardware
Practical multiprogramming environments should provide features that prevent a program execution from invalidly
accessing resources assigned to other program executions [23], so hardware and operating systems have been designed
to work together to provide such features. For example, most modern processors have been designed to provide address
translation and page protection features.
Address translation maps logical addresses to physical addresses. This ensures that each program execution is given
a virtually isolated address space and prevents a program execution from accessing memory assigned to
another program execution.
Page protection divides the address space into fixed-length spaces, or pages, and sets permissions for accessing
them. The heap protection domain is implemented using this feature.
While the most modern processors support protection by page, Mondriaan memory protection (MMP) supports it
by word [24–26]. Such fine-grained protection is useful for protecting fine-grained memory areas, such as words for
global variables. MMP also provides hardware-level support for its protection domain. While the protection domain
provided by MMP is similar to ours, ours is implemented using an ordinary processor.
Some protection domains have been implemented using an ordinary processor like ours, and part of them have
reduced the overhead of setpd() using hardware support. Shinagawa [27] used the segmentation provided by IA32
processors to avoid TLB flushing on a protection domain switch, as shown in Fig. 8. He divided the linear address
space among protection domains, set permissions for each logical page in page table entries for each protection
domain’s linear address space, and used segment registers to determine which protection domain (which part of the
linear address space) to use. This method effectively switches protection domains by simply rewriting the segment
registers, which does not flush the TLB. However, it may not be appropriate for server-side Java applications that
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Fig. 9. Processor with tagged TLB.
consume gigabytes of heap, because it reduces the available logical address space as the number of protection domains
grows. However, Shinagawa’s implementation is practical for PowerPC processors [28]. Both IA32 and PowerPC
processors implement virtual memory using segmentation and paging. They first translate each logical address into
an intermediate address using segmentation and then translate the intermediate address into a physical address using
paging. While the intermediate (linear) address space is 32-bit in IA32 processors, it is 52-bit in 32-bit PowerPC
processors. Shinagawa’s implementation reduces the available logical space because it divides the 32-bit linear address
space of IA32 processors among the protection domains. Dividing the intermediate address space is not a problem for
PowerPC processors because their intermediate address space is large enough.
Palladium [29] also uses segmentation to implement a memory protection scheme that is similar to our heap
protection domain. Palladium does not suffer the problem of Shinagawa’s implementation. Palladium classifies
programs into core programs and their extension programs, and prevents the extension programs from accessing the
memory area of their core program. Palladium protects memory more efficiently than does our heap protection domain.
It implements an inter-protection domain call by simply using a far-call instruction, which rewrites the segmentation
registers. This implementation is thus much more efficient than our implementation using setpd(), which involves
system calls and TLB flushes. However, Palladium cannot prevent an extension program from invalidly accessing the
memory for another extension program, and it cannot be implemented on platforms that do not support segmentation.
In contrast, our heap protection domain allows each subprogram to have its own protected heap and can be easily
ported.
Processor support for the protection domain can reduce the frequency of TLB flushing. The processor can use
reserved (unused) bits in the directory entry to add access control bits for multiple protection domains in one directory
entry. This reduces not only the number of PGDs but also the frequency of TLB flushes, because a TLB flush is not
needed with setpd() if the old and new protection domains to which the thread belongs share a PGD. Unfortunately,
there is not yet a processor that supports this capability.
Another processor support for the protection domain is a tagged TLB [10,30–34]. A tagged TLB can hold address
transformation information for multiple address spaces. A processor with a tagged TLB has a register that holds an
address space identifier (ASID), and each TLB entry has an ASID field, as shown in Fig. 9. The processor looks up
the TLB by comparing the ASID as well as the logical address. Thus, two entries in the tagged TLB can hold the same
logical address if their ASIDs differ. With this feature, there is no need to flush the TLB on an address space switch,
and this enables the efficient implementation of a protection domain as an address space [35]. Such an implementation
has redundancy in that each protection domain has the same address translation information. Koldinger proposed an
architectural support that removes this redundancy [36].
Hardware-level detection of bugs that misuse non-pointer values as pointers has also been investigated.
System/38TM 8 [37] assigns a tag bit to each memory word and sets the tag bit value to 1 if the value in the
corresponding memory word is a pointer, thereby permitting a value in a memory word to be used as a pointer to
reference memory only if the tag bit value is 1.
8 PowerPC, System/38 and i5/OS are trademarks or registered trademarks of International Business Machines Corporation in the United States
and other countries.
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Fig. 10. Overview of Czajkowski’s system.
6.4. Operating systems
An operating system implements virtual memory and memory access control by using the address translation and
page protection features provided by hardware.
Mainstream operating systems such as Windows and Linux divide program executions into processes and assign
a logical address space to each process. Because they provide memory access control to each process, not to each
thread, every thread in a process has the same memory access permission. This means that the heap protection feature
presented here cannot be simply implemented in these operating systems. On such an OS, Czajkowski implemented a
system that protects JVM from native method execution by dividing JVM execution into two processes: one executes
Java applications and the other executes native methods [38]. To isolate the native method execution, the system scans
a native library and automatically generates proxy methods for the native methods. At runtime, the JVM invokes the
proxy method instead of the native method, and then, the proxy method invokes the native method in the other process
using inter-process communication (IPC), as illustrated in Fig. 10. The system not only protects a wider range of
memory but also prevents conflicts between the JVM and native methods in the usage of operating system resources
such as signal handlers. The system protects a wider range of memory than our heap protection feature, because it
protects stacks, global variables, and heap allocated using malloc().9 Prevention of operating system resource usage
conflicts is attractive to native method developers especially when they develop native methods for a JVM with poorly
documented operating system resource usage. This prevention enables the development of native methods that are
independent of the JVM implementation. The system is more practical than our heap protection feature in that it
does not require changing the JVM nor the operating system. MVM [39] is a JVM implementation that protects JVM
execution as the system does. However, the system and MVM suffers large runtime overhead from JNI calls, which
are implemented using IPC. Czajkowski estimated the execution time of SPECjvm98 to be approximately ten times
longer at most [38] if all JNI calls were implemented using IPC. Another problem with the system is the different
semantics of native methods. For example, a native method that redirects the standard error does not redirect output
from JVM when executed using the system. Our heap protection feature does not suffer these problems.
Hydra [40–42], Opal [43], and i5/OSR© [44] provide memory access control features like the heap protection domain
described here. i5/OS is a commercial OS currently in use, and JVMs for i5/OS [45] can easily support heap protection.
However, to the best of our knowledge, there have been no previous reports on the runtime overhead incurred in
protecting the heap.
7. Conclusion
We have described a feature that protects the heap for Java virtual machines by using the heap protection domain.
This feature helps to detect bugs in native methods that invalidly access the heap. The practicality of the feature is
limited because it requires JVM and OS modification, but the amount of the source code to be added or modified is
about 60 lines in the JVM and about 500 lines in the OS. The runtime overhead for the heap protection also limits its
practicality, but the amount depends on the frequency with which native methods are called. We evaluated the runtime
9 On the basis of our seven years’ JVM maintenance experience, we judge that most hard-to-analyze crashes come from invalid access to the
heap for Java instances or dynamically compiled code. We thus designed our heap protection feature to cover this area only, so as to improve
performance.
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overhead by running the SPECjvm98, SPECjbb2000, VolanoMark, and JFCMark benchmark suites on a PC with two
Intel Xeon 1.6 GHz processors. The performance loss was less than 2% for the benchmark items that do not call
native methods so frequently (∼104 times per second), 5%–20% for the benchmark items that do (104–105 times per
second). The worst performance loss was 54%, which was recorded for a benchmark item that calls native methods
2.0× 106 times per second. Despite its limitations, we believe our heap protection feature can aid in debugging native
methods.
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